The Information Superhighway: A First Amendment Roadmap by Lively, Donald E
Boston College Law Review
Volume 35
Issue 5 Number 5 Article 2
9-1-1994
The Information Superhighway: A First
Amendment Roadmap
Donald E. Lively
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Donald E. Lively, The Information Superhighway: A First Amendment Roadmap, 35 B.C.L. Rev. 1067
(1994), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol35/iss5/2
THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY: A
FIRST AMENDMENT ROADMAPf
DONALD E. LIVELY *
Press freedom over the past half century has reflected a primary
sense that media are distinguishable in their nature and effect. Con-
sistent with an understanding of the unique nature of each method of
communication, constitutional principle has been driven by the prem-
ise that "differences in the characteristics of new media justify differ-
ences in the First Amendment standards applied to them."' Medium-
specific analysis comports. with Justice Jackson's observation, nearly
half a century ago, that media "have differing natures, values, abuses,
and dangers. Each, in my view, is a law unto itself"' Attention to
difference has resulted in as many First Amendment standards for
media as there are identifiable media forms.3 This focus on media
distinction, however, has become miscalibrated, as media structure and
capability increasingly reflect convergence rather than divergence. At
a time when modern means of communication tend toward common
characteristics 4 and merger into new methods,' constitutional and reg-
t Copyright 1994 Donald E. Lively.
* Professor, College of Law, The University of Toledo; ID., University of California, Los
Angeles; M,S,, Northwestern University; A.B., University of California, Berkeley.
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (broadcasting); 'accord FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (broadcasting); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495, 503 (1952) (motion pictures); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1447-48 (D.C.
Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986) (cable),
2 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, j., concurring) (agreeing with Court in
upholding regulation of sound trucks using public thoroughfares).
3 Variable standards of First Amendment protection are evidenced, for instance, by the
regulatory management of broadcasting even as similar controls are struck down for the print
media. E.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co, v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (striking down
right to reply law enabling victims of personal editorial attack to respond); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at
370, 400-01 (upholding fairness regulation that among other things requires right to reply in
the event of personal editorial attack).
4 Exemplifying common capabilities is the increasing use of satellite technology by both
newspapers and broadcasters to disseminate information from the editorial origination point to
a print out on paper, computer monitor or television screen. The printed word and graphic
imagery also are propagated by teletext and videotext services that blur traditional distinctions
between print and electronic media.
5 Merged characteristics are evidenced by the evolving combination of activities by cable and
telephone companies that, although historically viewing each other as adversaries, are moving
toward joint ventures for the establishment of new interactive communication systems. See, e.g.,
1067
1068	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 35:1067
ulatory premises etched and adhered to over the past several decades
merit reexamination.
As technology and market dynamics reshape the contours and
capabilities of media, constitutional and regulatory theory becomes
captive to a dated ritual. Differentiation, as noted, is central to deter-
mination of a medium's First Amendment standing. In terms of broad-
casting, for example—still considered scarce from a medium-specific
perspective in an age of expanding information resources6—the pub-
lic's First Amendment right to receive diverse views and voices is "para-
mount."' The constitutional glossing reflects the reality that broad-
casting has historically received the most limited First Amendment
protection. 8
This constitutional status of broadcasting is a function of regula-
tory assumptions that seriously lag behind economic and technological
circumstances. In reality, broadcasters, cablecasters, common carriers
and even publishers aspire toward or already provide broadband inter-
active services enabling users to originate, access and exchange a wide
range of data, voice and video services. 9
 Reinvention of established
media occurs at the same time wireless technology introduces new,
expanded and possibly superseding methods of interactivity and choice.°
As technology enhances and redefines the information market-
place, old questions of power, control and opportunity are destined to
acquire fresh meaning. Historically, the advent of a new medium, or
significant enhancement of an established medium's capability, has
been the occasion for a First Amendment crisis." Unlike significant
developments of the past, which shaped a mass media controlled by a
Harry A. Jessell, Rico to Compete Head to Head with MSO in NJ., BROADCASTING, Dec. 21, 1992,
at 4; see also infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388.
7 Id. at 390.
8
 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
9
 The trend toward convergence of function was anticipated in the seminal works of ITHIEL
DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1983); M. ETHAN KATSH, ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW (1989). Increasingly, it is commanding the attention of popular
media. E.g., Entertainment and Technology, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 1994, at 1222.
19
 In many communities and countries not yet wired for cable, for instance, a likely option
seems to be one of leapfrogging from traditional broadcasting to enhanced choice and interac-
tivity as a function of rapidly evolving wireless technology. Such an option avoids the time-con-
suming and costly process of establishing a wire network—a task that in the United States is still
unfinished despite the cable industry's longevity. See infra note 19.
II The initial official response to motion pictures was to deny: them status as part of the press.
See infra note 17 and accompanying text. Broadcasting even now is the least protected" medium.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text. At least through the 1970's, cable was burdened by
federal regulation largely protective of the broadcast industry. See DONALD E. LIVELY, MODERN
CommumicivrioNs LAW 257-61 (1991).
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relative few, current trends of choice and interactivity introduce market
driven conditions for diversity and participation. Modern economic
and technological forces encourage convergence, rather than differ-
entiation, of media and foster conditions that may reclaim significant
aspects of a soapbox culture. These trends render a rethinking of basic
constitutional assumptions essential. This Article will (1) examine the
historical premises of media regulation and note their mounting de-
ficiencies in the context of evolving technology; (2) consider trends
toward media convergence and the implications for a regulatory order
based upon difference; and (3) inventory the constitutional choices
for reckoning with common denominators of interactivity and ex-
panded choice.
I. TOWARD AN INTEGRATION OF FUNCTION AND COMMONALITY OF
STANDARDS
Contemporary media regulation reflects perceptions and assump-
tions that, contrasted with the rapidly evolving conditions over which
it presides, seem profoundly stale. The notion that different media
present "peculiar problems," 12 and thus should be governed by diver-
gent constitutional standards,'s assumes that methods of processing
and distributing information are distinguishable in meaningful ways.
For the better part of the twentieth century, attention to difference has
been facilitated by obvious structural dissimilarities among media. Even
though each medium has the overarching function of disseminating
information, distinctions based on notions of relative scarcity," im-
pact'' and market leverage'" have been drawn.
Medium-specific standards, as developed over the course of this
century," have resulted in a First Amendment hierarchy of the press.
12Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
13 /d. at 502; see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) ("differences
in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied
to them").
14 See, e.g., Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388 ("it is idle to posit an unbridgeable First. Amendment
right to broadcast . [w]here there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast
than there are frequencies to allocate").
15 See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978) (upholding regulation
of broadcast indecency pursuant to concern with medium's pervasiveness and effect on children).
16 See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2466 (1994) (cable
operator's "bottleneck, or gatekeeper; control over most (if not all) of the television programming
that is channeled into the subscriber's home ... [creates] potential for abuse ... over a central
avenue of corn munication [that] cannot he overlooked").
17 Mass media are primarily a twentieth century phenomenon. As new media have evolved,
their constitutional credentials have been challenged. Motion pictures initially were denied status
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Within that order, the printed word enjoys the most constitutional
protection,i8 broadcasting the least,' 9
 and other media fit somewhere
between.° As media capabilities converge, therefore, a critical consti-
tutional choice looms. Whether freedom of the press is to be defined
in the expansive terms that have governed print or in the pinched
manner that has applied to broadcasting hangs in the balance. 2 '
Attention to difference and consequent variances in constitutional
conditions and regulatory possibilities22 have facilitated medium-spe-
cific regimes of editorial management. Governance of broadcasting
historically has been inspired by the sense that broadcasting is a scarce
medium.° Understanding of the broadcast spectrum as finite, with
"substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are
frequencies to allocate,"" has resulted in regulation marked by basic
as part of the press. Mutual Film Co. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915),
overruled // Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). Broadcasting, although never
denied First Amendment status, is characterized by diminished interests in editorial freedom. See,
e.g., Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390. Cable's First Amendment credentials are still in the process of
being sorted. See Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2456; City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications,
Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1984). Although the Court has noted that the rationale for less rigorous
First Amendment analysis of broadcast regulation does not apply to cable, Turner, 114 S. Ct. at
2456, it has stressed "that the unique physical characteristics of cable transmission should [not]
be ignored when determining the constitutionality of regulations affecting cable speech." Id. at
2457.
13 See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259 (1973) (White, J.,
concurring) (noting a "virtually insurmountable barrier between government and the print
media").
13 See, e.g., Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 ("of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that
has received the most limited First Amendment protection"). Although the least protected,
broadcasting is the most dominant medium. Radio and television programming is received
respectively in 99% and 98.2% of the nation's homes. US. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1991, No. 919, at 556. Daily newspapers in 1991 had a per
capita circulation rate of .251. fri. In 1992, 61.5% of the nation's households subscribed to cable.
WORLD ALMANAC AND ROOK OF FACTS 295 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1994).
"Cable, for instance, has been analogized both to broadcasting and to print for purposes
of determining its First Amendment status. See, e.g., Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434,
1449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (analogizing cable to print), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986); Berkshire
Cablevision of R.I., Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 986-87 (D.R.1. 1983) (analogizing cable to
broadcasting), vacated on other grounds, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985).
21 The constitutional model for broadcasting, in particular, allows for redistribution of First
Amendment rights at the expense of traditional notions of editorial freedom. Compare Miami
Herald, 418 U.S. at 258 (invalidating state law providing for content balance) with Red Lion, 395
U.S. at 400-01 (upholding rule providing for content balance).
22 See, e.g., Miami Heralds 418 U.S. at 258; Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 400-01.
23 See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 1050 (1990) (upholding minority preferences
in licensing process pursuant to concern with spectrum scarcity); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390
(upholding fairness doctrine pursuant to concern with spectrum scarcity).
24 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388.
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licensing requirements 25 and public interest duties. 2° Regulatory details
include basic qualifying standards and comparative criteria for licen-
sure,27 limitations on the number of stations an individual or entity may
own,28 restrictions on cross-ownership of media properties, 29 and pro-
visions to enhance the number of minority licensees." In addition to
such structural dictates, Congress and the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") have imposed programming controls that, if ap-
plied to other media, would not pass constitutional muster. 5 ' Regula-
tion of content has been calculated both to promote 52 and limit"
expressive pluralism. Prevailing constitutional standards accommodate
such tension. 54
The premise of spectrum scarcity results in an "unusual order" of
First Amendment interests." A quarter of a century ago, the Supreme
25 The requirement of a license to broadcast is established by the Communications Act of
1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 307 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
26 The fundamental obligation of a licensee, and basic consideration for a licensing decision,
is service of the "public convenience, interest, or necessity." 47 U.S.C. § 307(a).
27 Basic licensure qualifications include American citizenship, technical know-how, good
character, and sufficient capital. 47 U.S.C. 308(b) (1988), When competing applications are
made for a license, selection criteria include ownership diversification, ownership participation
in management and any past performance. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings,
F.C.C.2d 393, 394-95 (1965).
26 Ownership rules generally restrict broadcast holdings to a maximum of 18 AM, 18 FM and
18 television stations. In re Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. 6387 (1092). Broad-
casters traditionally have been prohibited from owning more than one stallion of the same type
in a given market. Id Duopoly rules have been relaxed to enable radio broadcasters to own
multiple stations in a single market, subject to limitations on market dominance and cumulative
audience share. Id
29 Cross-ownership rules preclude collocated holdings of newspapers and broadcast proper-
ties and collocated cable systems and television stations or common carriers. 47 U.S.C. ,§ 533
(1988 & Supp. 1992).
"Act of Dec. 22, 1987, Pub. L. No, 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-31 (1987). Minority preferences
in the broadcast licensing process were upheld in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. a. FCC, 497 U.S. 1050
(1990).
31 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
92 Fairness regulation, for instance, has attempted to promote "the right of the public to
receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences." Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCG, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
99
	
of indecent expression limits the public's programming choices. Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that rules limiting time
when indecent programming may be aired "curtail[] ... broadcaster freedom and adult listener
choice").
" The Court has upheld both diversity enhancement and restrictive schemes. See Metro
Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 599-600 (upholding racial preferences in licensing process); FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978) (upholding regulation of indecent program-
ming); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (upholding fairness doctrine as means of promoting content
diversity).
95 CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 04, 1111 (1973).
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Court determined that fairness obligations imposed upon broadcasters
did not abridge freedom of the press." The fairness doctrine and
related rules," by design and effect, redistributed First Amendment
power in the electronic forum." Until abandonment of the fairness
doctrine in 1987," broadcasters were obligated to devote a reasonable
amount of programming to controversial issues of public importance
and provide balanced attention to such matters." Through the fairness
doctrine, the Court identified a medium-specific exception to the
general principle that government may not diminish the expressive
freedom of some to enhance the speaking opportunities of others."
Finding "it idle to posit an unbridgeable First Amendment right to
broadcast comparable to the right . . to ... publish," 42 the Court
concluded that "the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of
the broadcasters, . is paramount."" Such a constitutional order ill-
uminates broadcasting's second-class First Amendment status."
Courts and commentators alike have contested scarcity assump-
tions and implications," and the FCC itself has abandoned the fairness
doctrine in favor of First Amendment parity for broadcasters and
publishers." Modern constitutional review, however, continues to use
36
 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389-90.
37 The fairness doctrine itself obligated broadcasters to cover controversial issues of public
importance and provide for balanced treatment of them. See infra note 40 and accompanying
text. Rules designed to promote the interests of balance and diversity include reasonable access
to airtime and equal time provisions for political candidates, 47 U.S.C. §§ 312 (a) (7), 315 (1988),
the right to reply to personal attacks, 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1990), and political editorial rules, 47
C.F.R. § 73.1930 (1990).
38 The net result is that the public's right "to have the medium function consistently with the
ends and purposes of the First Amendment" is made "paramount" to the First Amendment rights
of broadcasters. Red Lion, 395.U.S. at 390.
"The fairness doctrine was abandoned in 1987. Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043
(1987), aff'd, Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied. 493 U.S.
1019 (1990). Since then, Congress has unsuccessfully moved to codify the fairness doctrine.
Legislation to that effect was passed but vetoed by President Reagan. Bill Holland, it's Ba—ack,
BILLBOARD, Feb. 2, 1991, at 2 (discussing the veto and subsequent fairness initiatives by Congress).
4° Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards
of the Communications Act, 98 F.C.C.2c1 1, 7 (1974).
41
 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-92 (1978).
42
 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388.
43 Id at 390.
44 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (broadcasting has "the most limited
First Amendment protection").
45 See, e.g., Telecommunications Research & Action Cu; v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987); David L. Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunica-
ii OM Press, 1975 DUKE U. 213, 223-29; Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace
Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 Thx. L. REV. 207 (1982).
46 Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5055-57 (1987), affd, Syracuse Peace Council v.
FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
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the scarcity premise to perpetuate broadcasting's subordinate status. 47
Administrative observations to the effect that broadcasters occupy the
same First Amendment plane as publishers, moreover, seem primarily
of rhetorical significance." At the same time that the FCC has repudi-
ated fairness principles and ideology, for example, it has fortified its
resolve to curb indecent programming.'• Such a content restrictive
initiative derives not from concern with scarcity but rather from an
official sense of the pervasiveness and unique accessibility of the broad-
cast medium to children. 50 Medium-specific assumptions and conse-
quences thus persist, with regulatory change reflecting some discretely
redirected attention rather than wholesale recalibration of analytical
perspective.
The advent of technology facilitating reproduction of the printed
word begot mass communication. 51 For more than four centuries, pub-
lishing exclusively defined mass media methodology. Systems of com-
prehensive control initially defined official response to the capabilities
of print." Although concepts of press freedom eventually evolved, and
in the United States became constitutionally enshrined," regulatory
impulses reflecting concern with impact have continued to manifest
themselves and vie against press freedom. Not even the most constitu-
tionally prioritized media have been immune from regulatory pres-
sure. As print methodology obtained the capacity to disseminate pic-
tures in addition to words, the medium's focus, reach and methods
47 Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2456 (1994) (reaffirming that
"justification for our distant approach to broadcast regulation rests upon the unique physical
limitations of the broadcast medium"); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 1050 (1990)
(stressing paramount First Amendment interests Of public).
4S See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
49 For all of the criticism directed at fairness regulation as an abridgment. of editorial
freedom, it seldom was enforced vigorously. See infra note 133 and accompanying text. Over the
past decade, decency enforcement has been pursued seriously and with major consequences for
some broadcasters. E.g., jot: Flint, FCC Fines Stern $600K; OK's Dea,,I BROADCAs•ING, Dec. 21,
1992, at 5; Kim McAvoy, FCC Hands Out $80,000 in Fines, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 25,
1993, at 42.
5° See, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281 (1992).
61 The printing press was a mid-15th-century invention of Johann Gutenberg, ,see BEN BAG-
DIKIAN, THE INFORMATION MACHINES 7-9, 192 (1971).
52 The English Licensing Act, abandoned in 1694, established printing monopolies under
the authority of the Crown. See 3 .10SEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STA•I'ES § 1876 (1833); Thomas Emerson, 77te Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 2 LAW &
CoNTENIP. PROBS. 648, 650 (1955), Even after the Act's repeal, taxation and seditious libel were
used effectively to control the process. LnoNAlcif W. LEVY, LEGACY of SUPPRESSION 8-17 (1968).
"Freedom of speech and of the press is secured by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution and by various provisions of state constitutions.
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became grounds for concern. Even before electronic media became
subject to extensive regulation, 54
 prominent scholars and commenta-
tors sounded an early warning with respect to the press's intrusive
nature and priorities. 55
Differences among media have not been difficult to discern, even
if they have not always been significant. 56
 Practical considerations such
as literacy requirements and product immutability, for instance, qualify
the function of print media. Distribution methods requiring, for in-
stance, the use of public rights of way may implicate local police power
interests." Newer media such as broadcasting, however, differ structur-
ally insofar as radio and television transmissions are "in the air" 58 and
defeasible by signal range and interference. Early experience with
broadcasting, characterized by "confusion and chaos," generated de-
mands for a system of governmental oversight that would establish and
maintain efficient usage of the broadcast spectrum. 59 Central to mod-
ern regulation of broadcasting is a system of licensing that, although
unallowable for publishing, provides the basis for extensive controls
upon radio and television operators. 6° Notwithstanding its longevity as
a regulatory premise, scarcity represents a misplaced concern and a
principal discredit to medium-specific analysis. The primary impedi-
ment to the existence or functioning of any mass medium is sufficient
capital.61
 The scarcity phenomenon that has excluded the vast majority
"Congress originally regulated broadcasting pursuant to the Radio Act of 1027 and then by
the Communications Act. of 1934. The regulatory background of broadcasting is discussed in
NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-16 (1943).
55
 Brandeis' seminal work on a right of privacy reflected a concern with journalistic values
that favored gossip, sensationalism and intrusion into personal lives over matters of genuine
community concern. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right w Privacy, 4 HARV, L.
REV. 193, 196 (1890).
"Scarcity, insofar as it is recognized for broadcasting but not for print, represents "a
distinction without a difference." Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d
501, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987). As the court observed, an "attempt
to use a universal fact as a distinguishing principle necessarily leads to analytical confusion." Id.
Concern that broadcasting compromises privacy interests, to the extent that it is pervasive or
intrusive, actually cuts against privacy concerns of personal autonomy and choice. See FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 764-66 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57
 Zoning regulations may affect the placement of news vendors and stands and, to the extent
content may be sexually explicit, may significantly limit distribution points. See, e.g., Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976). Local authorities also have an interest in
the physical structure of a cable system, insofar as it may implicate land use and assignment of
pole space. See generally City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488
(1984) (considering city's refusal to grant cable system access to poles or underground conduits).
"Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 842 (19(19).
56 NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212-17 (1943).
66 See 511pro notes 25-30, 37-38 and accompanying text.
61 See Donald E. Lively, Deregulatory Illusions and Broadcasting: The First Amendment's Endur-
ing Forited 'Tongue, 66 N.C. L. REV. 963, 968 (1988).
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of persons from media ownership, therefore, primarily reflects eco-
nomics rather than physics. Inattention to that reality, unfortunately,
has resulted in persisting emphasis upon difference in the face of
similarity."'
Courts advert to spectrum scarcity, 63 pervasiveness and easy ac-
cess to children''`' in rationalizing broadcasting's status as the medium
with the "most limited First Amendment. protection."°' Although cable
derives and retransmits significant amounts of programming from broad-
casters,67 it often has been analogized to print media.° Unlike broad-
casting and more like publishing, the analogy goes, access to cable
requires affirmative acts of engagement on the part of the viewer. 6°
Concern with cable's impact on children is minimized, moreover, by
affordable methods of blocking access to specific channels." Similarly,
when the Supreme Court invalidated a federal law prohibiting inde-
cent transmissions by telephone, it cited adequate and affordable means
to control access as a significant factor. 71
An especially disturbing aspect of cable, at least from a regulatory
perspective, is the "bottleneck, or gatekeeper" phenomenon." The
ability of cable operators to control program menu has generated
legislative and judicial concern with the potential for market abuse that
might impair the free flow of information." The Cable Television
Protection Act of 1992 74 imposed must-carry obligations upon broad-
62 See supra notes 45, 59 and accompanying text.
"Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-90 (1969).
64 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
65 M.
66 Id. at. 748.
67 Retransmission of television programming has been a continuing source of friction be-
tween broadcasters and cablecasters. In cable's early years, the FCC imposed restrictions on the
importation of distant signals, United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968),
and required cable operators to originate programming as a condition for retransmitting over-
the-air signals. United States v. Midwest Video Corp. 406 U.S. 649 (1972). Over the past decade,
FCC rules mandating the carriage of local broadcast signals have been invalidated twice. Century
Communications Corp, v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 304 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U,S. 1033
(1988); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 E2c1 1434, 1462-63 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1169 (1986). The Supreme Court has remanded must-carry's third incarnation to the district
court with instructions to determine whether it actually is supported by an important governmen-
tal interest, Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc, v. FCC, 114 S. Cl. 2445, 2472 (1994).
" See, e.g., Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 61 l F. Stipp. 1099, 1112 (D.
Utah), aff'd sub nom, Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), affd without opinion., 480
U.S. 926 (1987).
69 See id. at 1112-14.
7° See id. at 1113.
71 Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127-28, 131 (1989).
Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2460 (1994).
73 Id. at 2461.
74 Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
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casters requiring them to distribute local broadcast signals?" The leg-
islation reflects concern that cable has attained "undue market power"
attributable to having displaced broadcast reception in more than sixty
percent of the nation's households?" Because franchising requirements
and capital costs have conspired toward establishing monopolistic con-
ditions in the cable industry, Congress determined that "market posi-
tion gives cable operators the power and incentive to harm broadcast
competitors."77
As the Court has noted in reviewing the must-carry provisions, the
risk that broadcasters might be dropped from or adversely reposi-
tioned on a cable system's menu is heightened by mounting competi-
tion for advertising revenue and vertical integration favoring affiliated
programmers. 78 Much like the Newspaper Preservation Act's 79 aim to
rescue failing urban newspapers, pressed competitively by suburban
dailies and other media,8° must-carry regulation reflects official man-
agement and real location of the economic power and information
marketplaces. Both regulatory schemes represent First Amendment
affirmative action plans that redistribute editorial power in an attempt
to forestall obsolescence, despite consequential burdens upon compet-
ing media. 81 They seem inspired by the premise that If] reedom to
publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to
keep others from publishing is not. Freedom of the press from govern-
mental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction
repression of that freedom by private interests." 82
Mixed regulatory models and results reflect the medium-specific
perspective that has increasingly driven constitutional, statutory and
administrative analysis over the course of the twentieth century. Me-
dium-specific review, however, fails as a means of reckoning with mod-
ern methods of communication. As noted previously," discernment of
75 47 U.S.C. § 534 (Supp. 1992).
76 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2454.
77 Id
78 Id. at 2454-55.
79 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-05 (1988).
"See Donald E. Lively, New Media, Old Dogma, 30 ARIZ. L. REv, 257, 265-66 (1988).
Ill Allowing a failing newspaper to enter into a joint operating agreement with its healthier
rival, IS U.S.C. § 1803(b) induces economies of scale that may make it difficult for other
newspapers in the community to compete. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,
354 U.S. 594, 604-05 (1953). Must-carry obligations, designed to ensure the availability of free
local television, may result in costs both to the editorial freedom and the profits of cable
operators.
82 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
"See supra notes 45, 59 and accompanying text.
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difference is less a science than an art and thus is imprecise. For
long-term purposes, such an analytical construct has little to recom-
mend it.
The full dimensions of future communications methods may be
impossible to chart. What today appears futuristic becomes obsolete
tomorrow as a function of rapid technological progress." As all media,
currently distinguished on the basis of appearance, method or impact,
course toward broadband services—with common capabilities for data,
voice and video transmissions"— analysis that stresses difference has
diminishing relevance and justification.
Media convergence, although eliminating one set of constitutional
and regulatory issues, introduces questions that are no less profound.
Although the case for distinguishing media becomes increasingly less
persuasive, issues will persist at a more general level. The power of
network operators and the integration or separation of content and
carriage functions, for example, will draw increasing attention.'" Inter-
activity will likely renew issues of access which as a methodology of
promoting First Amendment values in the context of print, 87 broadcast-
ing"' and cable," mostly has been denied. As media reconstruct the
information marketplace, and speaking and input opportunities aug-
ment the existing role of passive viewer or listener," inversion of First
Amendment rights to promote First Amendment values may become
even less compelling. Rather than ignore concern with the distribution
84 The recent history or personal communications systems aptly illustrates the rapidity, con-
sequences and market risks of compounding innovation. Within months of the American Tele-
phone & Telegraph Company's decision to purchase McCaw Cellular Communications, for
purposes of capitalizing upon a coming market liar advanced portable wireless systems, MCI
Communications purchased Nextel Communications, Edmund L. Andrews, MCI Plans Big Nextel
Stake. As a Move Into Wireless, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. I, 1994, at Cl In so doing, MCI anticipated
developing Nextel's specialized mobile radio capabilities into a digital system that would leapfrog
existing cellular technology and carry digital communications. Market response to the system's
poor sound quality was so negative, however, that the deal collapsed. Mark Lewin, How MCI Got
a Bad Connection, Bus. WK., Sept. 12, 1994, at 34.
"See Andrew Barrett, The Tideoommunications Infrastructure of the Future, 23 U. Tot.. L. REV.
85, 86 (1991).
"See id ("policy issues" of future "will focus on the divisions and safeguards between content
and transport").
87
	 Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
" CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110-13 (1973).
" FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 709 (1979). Although broad access rights have
been rejected, federal law allows franchising authorities to establish public, educational and
governmental access, 47 U.S.C. § 531 (1988), and requires cable operators with 36 or more
channels to designate up to 15% of their capacity to commercial access. 47 U.S.C. § 532 (1988
& Stipp. 1992).
90 The public's paramount First Amendment rights encompass an interest in receiving diverse
views and voices. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U,S. 367, 388-90 (1969),
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of First Amendment power and opportunity, regulators and courts may
condition participation on cost and availability. 91
Tactical decisions of existing media to redefine or realign them-
selves underscore the movement toward a new communications order.
Strategic alliances between cable systems and telephone companies 92
and of hardware operators and software producers herald a future in
which convergence is a defining trait." The advent of.video dialtone
service previews the crumbling of established structural models. 94 Such
developments foreshadow an era in which a regulatory structure, fo-
cused upon difference, chronically lags or becomes a drag upon pro-
gress. As reality pressures the existing regulatory order, the question
of what constitutional model(s) will govern the new information mar-
ketplace becomes crucial. One set of First Amendment standards, as
noted previously," brooks little interference with editorial autonomy.
Constitutional review of broadcasting 96 and cable97 has accommodated
significant management of editorial functions. Common - carrier regu-
lation, although providing for equal access to all potential users on a
nondiscriminatory basis," denies any editorial interest of or function
by the network provider." Part II of this Article will examine models
01
 First Amendment norms, except in the area of broadcasting, disfavor redistribution of
expressive opportunity. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
92 See Jessell, supra note 5, at 4.
95
 Participants in the processes of alliance, merger and acquisition include both an extensive
line-up of telephone companies, cable systems and computer manufacturers, and product sources
such as movie studios, cable programmers and software producers. Richard Turner, Hollywired,
WA 1,1, ST.", Mar. 21, 1994, at. RI. By relaxing cross-ownership rules prohibiting cross-ownership
of networks and cable systems, 47 C.F.R. § 76.501 (1993), and allowing video dialtone service, 57
Fed. Reg. 41,106 (1992), the FCC has made it possible for networks and broadcasters to expand
their potential as software suppliers, Joe Flint, FCC Lets TV Networks into Cable Ownership,
BROADCASTING, June 22, 1992, at 4; Gerald E. Udwin, Monday Memo, BROADCASTING, July 27,
1992, at 18.
94 See Harry A. Jessell, FCC Calls for Telco TV, BROADCASTING, July 20, 1992, at 3. Video
dialtone is a service provided by a local exchange carrier that creates a transport fitcility with
"channel capacity . . . leased to unaffiliated programmers on a common carrier basis," Barrett,
supra note 84, at 96.
95 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
96 See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 1050 (1990) (upholding minority
preferences in licensing process); FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S.
775, 827-28 (1978) (upholding cross-ownership rules governing broadcasters and newspaper
publishers); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 409-10 (1969) (upholding fairness
regulation).
97 See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2469 (1994) (rules forcing
cable operations to carry local broadcast signals may be permissible if they truly promote
substantial governmental interest unrelated to speech and are narrowly drawn). The Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 531, authorizes franchising authorities to estab-
lish requirements for public, educational or governmental access to channel capacity.
98 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988).
99 See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 700-112 (1979).
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of media governance in the context of rapidly changing and converg-
ing technology.
II. TECHNOLOGIES OF CONVERGENCE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF CHOICE
• AND INTERACTIVITY
Choice and interactivity represent defining characteristics of fu-
ture media.m° Progress toward expanded program diversity can already
be attributed to cable's penetration into the majority of the nation's
households and the development of technologies such as wireless ca-
ble' and direct broadcast satellites.'° 2 Interactivity, albeit a primary
feature of computer on-line services and a significant magnet for invest-
ment, has yet to expand pervasively beyond basic telephone service.m
These evolving attributes of and conditions for media have profound
significance for methods of power distribution and exercise in the
information marketplace, as well as the governance of mass communi-
cations.
Print media function in a constitutional order that prioritizes
editorial autonomy.'" The prioritized First Amendment status of news-
papers and other nonelectronic textual media seems to reflect a heavy
factoring of historical tradition. 105 As digitalized satellite and fiber-optic
systems allow the transmission of electronic newspapers, magazines
and books,'°6 and publishers enter into strategic alliances for electronic
delivery of their product,'°7 any logic in the Court's tradition-based
rationale further diminishes.
1 °°Choice is a function of multichannel capacity. Interactivity provides both input and
receiving opportunities for subscribers.
101 Wireless cable, referred to technically as multipoint distribution service, has evolved as a
competitor to the cable industry primarily in urban areas. Transmission is via microwave signals
carried over a short distance that are converted and displayed on open VHF channels. DONALD
E. LIVELY, ESSENTIAL. PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNICATIONS LAW 345 (1992).
InDirect broadcast satellite service provides not only choice but, to the extent linked with
telephone lines, can provide interactivity. Sean Scully, Hubbard says DBS is Highway Enough,
BROADCASTING 8c CABLE, May 24, 1993, at 72; see also Mark Robichaux, The Players, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 21, 1994, at R16 (noting multibillion dollar investments in interactivity).
155 The interactive nature of on-line computer services is adverted to in note 142. Investment
in interactivity is discussed in note 159.
104 See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (government
regulation of editorial processes of newspaper inimical to freedom of the press).
1 °5 See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1982).
tt6 For instance, the Washington Post has developed an electronic newspaper prototype that
diSplays a picture much like the front page of a newspaper. Sean Scully, Comes the Revolution:
Digital Wireless PCS, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Sept. 27, 1993, at 22. Subscribers obtain additional
information, in the form of video, sound or text, by touching the screen. Id. The electronic
newspaper is capable of being transmitted via personal communications services, for which the
FCC recently has set aside a new band of radio frequencies. hi.
11)7 The nation's second largest newspaper chain, Knight-Ridder, Inc., is working with a
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A multilayered First Amendment, with medium-specific implica-
tions, may strike some as reasonable in consequence even if contorted
in theory." The defense of medium-specific analysis, however, tends
to discount two significant factors. First, as newer media become the
dominant instruments of communication, traditional protection of
print covers shrinking territory." Second, as media converge in their
nature and capability, courts or policymakers must eventually choose
between competing traditions."° The Court's sense that unrestricted
First Amendment freedom would consume First Amendment interests
is central to broadcasting's status as the least protected medium, even
as it has become the most dominant medium."' This "benign" regimen
of content control, which already has its own legacy of strained logic,
is becoming even more attenuated as media reconstruct themselves
with a common denominator of increased diversity and in teractivity." 2
regional telephone company, Bell Atlantic, to develop news, entertainment and advertising for
home delivery by means of a $15 billion interactive system that is being constructed. Robichaux,
supra note 102, at R16.
"8 Lee C. Bollinger, jr., Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial
Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1976) (arguing that legislated access to some
but not all of the press achieves the best of both constitutional and regulatory worlds).
109 DE SOLA POOL, supra note 9, at 1-10 (noting how First Amendment tradition stressing
editorial autonomy is subject to shrinkage as electronic media supersede print media).
im Id. Discounted First Amendment standards for newer media, even if initially regarded as
exceptional, have the potential to become normative. Preliminary indications that criteria dilu-
tion could extend to print media arc evidenced in the Court's review of rules requiring cable
systems to carry local broadcast signals. Although reaffirming the unconstitutionality of statutory
right to reply for a political candidate whose character was attacked by a newspaper, the Court
now stresses that the law "exacted a penalty on the basis of content." Turner Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2465 (1994) (quoting Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241, 256 (1974)). In so doing, the Court distinguished what it described as the content-neu-
tral nature of the must-carry rules. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2464. To the extent that 'Aria& is
understood as concerned primarily with viewpoint-based burdens, rather than with a general
proscription against compelling publishers or editors "to publish that which "'reason' tells them
should not be published," Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256, it is conceivable that viewpoint-neutral speech
control of the print media may be upheld. For purposes of ensuring the economic viability of
broadcasters, for instance, newspaper publishers might be required to print program listings even
if they preferred not to print such listings.
lu Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-91 (1969) (stressing need to
accommodate other views when access to medium is limited); see supra note 19 and accompanying
text.
112 Even before the advent of new technologies that provided expanded program choice,
scarcity was a dubious premise. At the time that the Court endorsed the scarcity rationale, the
number of radio and television stations exceeded the number of daily newspapers by a factor of
4.5. STATISTICAL. ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, nos. 906, 920, at 531, 536 (1994) (in 1970,
there were a total of 1,748 newspapers, 6,519 radio stations and 862 television stations). Insofar
as scarcity of all media is an economically driven phenomenon, arguments tied to this premise
must operate on a wholesale rather than discrete basis. Modern concern with broadcasting's




The finite nature of all resources, including the raw material,
capital and processes for publishing newspapers, exposes the weak
foundation of efforts to distinguish broadcasting as a scarce rnedium." 3
Because the Court refuses to forsake scarcity as a constitutional fac-
tor," 4
 however, it persists as a source of analytical confoundment. When
the Court rejected the extension of fairness principles to print me-
dia,"' even after upholding them for broadcasters," 6 it indicated that
entry into the newspaper business theoretically is unlimited."' Realis-
tically, the same could hold true for broadcasting." 8
 Diminished de-
mand for traditional broadcast usage," 9 as well as enhancement meth-
odology such as digital compression, 129
 suggests that economics is the
primary factor in determining who broadcasts and what program choices
exist.' 21
 Even at the height of regulatory attention to spectrum scarcity,
both the transferability of radio and television licenses and cost factors
diminished the significance of limited space.'" Scarcity accordingly
fails both as a source of legitimate regulatory concern and as a basis
for a special constitutional order.
Compelling logic to the contrary has not undone official resolve
for a redistribution of speaking rights in the electronic forum. Even
though the FCC has abandoned the fairness doctrine,'" scarcity con-
programming interferes with the competing privacy interest of personal choice. See supra note
56.
111 See Telecommunications Research &Action Cm v. FCC, 801 F,2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
wt. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
114
 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 1050 (1991) (upholding minority preferences
pursuant to understanding of spectrum scarcity).
115
 Miami Herald Publishing Go. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
116
 Red Lion Broadcasting Go. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390, 400-01 (1969).
117 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 247-56; see also Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1450
(D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
118 Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
119 Demand for AM broadcasting over the past decade, for instance, has decreased sig-
nificantly. The profitability of broadcasting, and market interest in radio and television properties,
also have declined as a function of inroads by new media into audience and revenue bases. Joe
Flint, Radio's Magic Numbers, BROADCASTING, Mar. 16, 1992, at 4.
12t) Compression technology essentially enables distributors of voice, data or video transmis-
sion to squeeze more information into a medium such as a wire and thus increase its carrying
capacity.
12 IAny applicant for a broadcast license must satisfy financial qualification standards. 47
U.S.C. § 308(b) (1988). Such requirements, along with the marketability of licenses and the
economic conditions alluded to at note 122 and accompanying text, define an industry to which
access is conditioned by affordability.
122 See Donald E. Lively, Broadcasting and the First Amendment: Rediscovering Freedom of the
Press, 67 WASI I. L. REV. 599, 604 (1992).
121 Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C,R. 5043 (1987).
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terns continue to inspire content control in the form of personal
attack, political editorial, political access rules 124 and structural schemes
calculated to enhance diversity.' 25 Moreover, despite administrative re-
pudiation of the fairness doctrine, 126
 Congress continually threatens to
reintroduce it. 121
 For a Court that demonstrates profound hostility to
notions of redistributive justice,' 28 a First Amendment affirmative ac-
tion plan making the rights of "viewers and listeners, not the right of
the broadcasters, . paramount,"''`9
 seems anomalous.
The "unusual order" of First Amendment rights 130 has been a
primary source of constitutional mystery, for ideological as well as
technical reasons. Arguably, the Court could have achieved similar
results through traditional strict scrutiny, without the need to manu-
facture a constitutional liberty interest. Radical construction and redistri-
bution of rights notwithstanding, purported beneficiaries of a glossed
First Amendment have realized little beyond formalistic gain. Except
under discrete circumstances, viewers and listeners have no real speak-
ing rights,' 31 and broadcasters have shied away from controversy.'"
Administrative enforcement of fairness obligations historically has been
exceptional rather than normative.'" Indeed, regulatory underachieve-
121 See supra note 37.
125 Rules establishing ownership ceilings, cross-ownership restrictions and minority prefer-
ences, for instance, reflect a common sense that ownership diversity facilitates program diversity.
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 1050 (1991) (upholding minority preferences in
licensing process as means of achieving program diversity); FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 795, 814-15 (1978) (upholding cross-ownership rules prohibiting
ownership of co-located newspapers and broadcast properties); United States v. Storer Broadcast-
ing Co., 351 U.S. 192, 203 (1956) (noting diversification purposes of ownership caps).
121i Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5057 (1987).
127 Since President Reagan's veto of legislation reestablishing the fairness doctrine, attempts
to codify it have become almost an annual exercise that at times has come close to succeeding.
Holland, supra note 38, at 2 (discussing history of legislative efforts to reintroduce fairness
doctrine).
1 m E.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (racial preferences
an impermissible means of accounting for societal discrimination).
129 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
13H CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973).
131 The limited conditions for personal access are identified at note 37 and accompanying
text.
' 32 Trading in orthodoxy has been attributed to broadcaster concern with economic costs of
controversy which could alienate advertisers and generate administrative and litigative expenses.
Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5055 (1987).
133 See, e.g., Public Issues under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of
the Communications Act, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 709 (1976) (Comm'r Robinson dissenting) (noting
that in 1973 and 1974, FCC received 4,280 fairness complaints but found against licensee in only
19 instances).
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ment, attributable to perceived risks of intrusion into the editorial
process, helped drive the FCC toward abandoning the fairness doc-
trine.'"
The limited and even negative returns of diversity enhancement
schemes derive in significant part from their operation against an easily
intimidated industry.'" Rhetoric concerning the facilitation of expres-
sive pluralism and balance, moreover, emanates against a backdrop of
official anti-diversity commitment. When first confronted with the broad-
cast of sexually explicit language on radio, the FCC determined that
offended viewers could exercise their autonomy to avoid such pro-
gramming and did not "have the right . . . to rule such programming
off the air." Any other decision, the FCC noted, would surrender to
the "wholly inoffensive, the bland."'" Even as audiences in some mar-
kets have propelled what the FCC characterizes as patently offensive
programming to eminent ratings status,'" regulation has disregarded
the concept of viewer or listener preference or subordinated it to
concern with the medium's pervasive nature or accessibility to chil-
dren.'" Pressure to expand the scope of content regulation, to control
indecent expression in other media contexts, previews the competition
among First Amendment models that will ultimately govern a con-
verged media universe. Although the Court has thus far rejected inde-
cency control for cable and common carriers,'" the case for expanding
154
 The unusual order of rights, especially in the context of fairness regulation, actually
functioned as an instrument of leverage against, rather than For, diversity. Syracuse Peace Council,
2 F.C.C.R. at 5055 (noting that economic, administrative and litigative costs deterred presentation
of controversial programming).
135 11. is in broadcasting that regulation by "lifted eyebrow," for instance, is especially effective.
Glen 0. Robinson, The. FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and
Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67, 119 (1967). Because liceusure is a condition fin. doing
business, broadcasters tend to be especially sensitive to official concern even when informally
expressed. Id. at 119-20.
I 36 Pacifica Found., 36 F.C.C. 147, 151 (1964).
157 1d.
1314 Three radio stations carrying the sexually explicit programming of Howard Stern in New
York, Philadelphia and Washington D.C., for instance, were fined $600,000. Nat lientoff, Now
the FCC Saves You From Indecency, VI LIAGE VOICE, May 25, 1993, at 28.
"9
 Infinity Broadcasting, 3 F.C.C.R. 930 (1989), vacated, Action for Children's Television v.
FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1339-41 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (affirming FCC's interest in protecting children
but remanding for more precise standards regarding permissible hours for indecent program-
ming); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found„ 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978) (explicating concerns
regarding children and pervasive nature of broadcasting).
N°Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989) (invalidating ban on
dial-a-porn services); Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Stipp. 1099 (D.
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the speech-restrictive model in the age of convergence will likely per-
sist, at least until a final constitutional reckoning.' 4 '
To the extent attention remains devoted to difference, First Amend-
ment standards for new media will remain a function of trial by anal-
ogy. As media shatter their traditional molds and evolve toward com-
mon characteristics and capabilities, such analysis becomes a dubious
exercise. Early indications of convergence, in the form of strategic
alliances among media concerns and ventures such as video dialtone,'"
foreshadow a future in which media will have more, rather than less,
in common.
To the extent that interactivity becomes a defining trait, distor-
tions of the information marketplace caused by one set of economic
and technological factors may be ameliorated by competing realities.
Telephone service until recently has provided the only electronic me-
dium characterized by meaningful interactivity, even if limited tradi-
tionally and primarily to two-way voice or data transmissions. Interac-
tivity has been enhanced over the past decade as computer networks
and on-line services have begun to utilize telephone service.'" Notwith-
standing the hybrid media that may be the offspring of strategic alli-
ances or technological innovation, it is not inconceivable that an es-
tablished medium may emerge as a primary source of interactivity.
Repeal of relevant cross-ownership rules enables broadcast networks
to merge with or acquire telephone companies and cable systems. 144
Even without such structural change, the impending advent of high
definition television ("HDTV") will provide additional bandwidth to
broadcasters.' 45 To the extent broadcasters receive permission to use
Utah 1985), affd sub nom. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Or. 1986), affd, 480 U.S. 926
(1987).
141 E.g., Sable, 492 U.S. at 133 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that equal access obligation
or common carriers does not extend to indecent messages); Information Providers Coalition for
Defense of the First Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 877 (9th Cir. 1991) (carrier may terminate
service to dial-a-porn operators).
142A computer network is a matrix of interconnected computer systems such as Internet,
which originally was intended to link government and academic communities but now has
broader public uses. Leslie Cauley, Does Anybody Speak English!, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 1994, at
R4. On-line services, such as Prodigy, CompuServe and America On-Line, provide information,
forums and a vast array of services to subscribers. Michael Meyer, The On-Line War Heats Up,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 28, 1994, at 38-39.
193 See supra note 142 and accompanying text
144 FCC relaxation of rules, prohibiting cross-owned broadcast network cable systems, enables
networks "to acquire cable systems serving up to 10% of homes passed nationwide and up to 50%
of homes passed in a market." Flint, supra note 93, at 4.
145 Kim McAvoy & Chris Stern, Broadcasters Gaining More Spectrum Opportunities, BROAD-
cAsTiNc, Mar. 21, 1984, at 6.
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broadband channels for purposes other than HDTV, individual broad-
casters could offer expanded program choices and some measure of
interactive service. 146 Digital technology also serves as a significant
factor in blurring traditional differences and facilitating multimedia
and interactive capability.
Convergence facilitates both enhanced diversity of content and
enhanced roles for viewers. Rules that effectively segregate media, and
disable them from merging their resources or expanding their func-
tion, compete against market efficiencies. 147
 Even so, telephone com-
pany entry into the cable business both domestically and overseas, as
well as innovative usage of copper wire technology to provide video
services, evidences the obscuring of traditional differences among me-
dia. Although prohibited from owning cable systems in their own
service areas, telephone companies may do so elsewhere. 148
 Accord-
ingly, either independently or in conjunction with cable companies,
common carriers have ventured increasingly into functions tradition-
ally performed by other hardware and software operators. Cable sys-
tems, meanwhile, have indicated an interest in providing telephone
service, which they now may also offer outside their service areas. 199
The trend toward multimedia function and convergence is accelerated
in less regulated circumstances, as software distributors such as movie
studios, computer program manufacturers, video suppliers and news-
paper companies form strategic alliances or merge with hardware
operators such as direct broadcast satellite systems, cable companies
and even common carriers.'"
Economically and technologically driven change in the nature and
capability of media presents a serious challenge to static regulatory
premises. In the conflict between technological change and static regu-
lation, the existence of significant market demand for new services
146 hd.
'47A planned merger between Tele-Communications, Inc. and Bell Atlantic fell through, for
instance, after the FCC rolled back cable rates pursuant to legislation requiring enhanced
economic regulation of the cable industry. Christopher Stern, Abrupt end to the Beginning,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Feb. 28, 1994, at 6. The new rate controls reduced the cable company's
cash flow and prompted Bell Atlantic to insist on a lower take-over price. Id, The deal fell through
when neither side could agree on "a mutually acceptable price." Id. Rate regulation also has
caused Southwestern Bell to renegotiate a $4.9 billion alliance with Cox Enterprises. Rich Brown,
C.ox, Southwestern Bell Restructure Deal, BROADCASTING & CA LILL, Mar. 14, 1994, at 6-7, As with
the Bell Atlantic deal, rate control diminished cash flow and thus altered the cable system's value.
IrL
l 48 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1988).
149
'`'') See supra notes 92
-94 and accompanying text.
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places the dynamics of technology at a significant advantage. Video
dialtone, for instance, has already penetrated the wall separating cable
and telephone service. Although initial video dialtone systems are
capable of carrying only a single video signal to homes within one mile
of a central office,'" video dialtone serves as an important wedge
enabling telephone companies both to test and gain experience in new
markets and to defuse resistance to their full-fledged entry as competi-
tors therein. The law of common carriage requires telephone compa-
nies to provide nondiscriminatory access to their lines and denies them
any content or programming function.'" Video dialtone rules have
compromised that tradition by allowing telephone companies to estab-
lish their own program subsidiaries.' 53 The phenomenon of hybrid
technology eliminating distinctions between preexisting structures con-
jures visions of a media universe in which televisions "act like phones,
and computers and phone lines ... carry TV shows and PC informa-
tion, [and] cable and phone companies . . . compete more directly
and .. cooperate."'"
Even as traditional differences among media vanish or diminish,
however, the pace of change may provide some breathing room for the
development of well-deliberated policy. Contrary to public and politi-
cal hyperbole about the construction of an information superhighway,
much of the fiber optic pathways are already in place.' 55 The final yards
of line from curb to terminal represents the primary missing link in
broadband capability and is a significant investment when compounded
by each home and office in the nation. Given uncertain demand for a
panoply of interactive possibilities,' 56 the primary barrier to superhigh-
way traffic is economic rather than technological. As uncertain eco-
nomics slow the technological pace, however, policymakers are af-
forded time and opportunity to fashion a regulatory environment that
responds to reality, rather than one that attempts to anticipate it.
A reference to history may be useful in gauging not only the
impact but the rate of change. To reach half of the nation's house-
153 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
153 The separation of program and carriage functions is a condition for telephone company
entry into the field. 57 Fed. Reg. 41106 (1992).
154 JOI1N NAISRITT, GLOBAL PARADOX 65 (1994).
155 Over the past several years telephone companies have laid over 95,000 miles of fiber optic
lines. Roberti Samuelson, Lost on the Information Highway, NEwswEEK, Dec. 20, 1993, at 111.
156
 Despite the reservations of skeptics who anticipate "a lot of disappoinunents," Michael
Meyer, 'i'he Hyperactive Highway, NEwswExx, Nov. 29, 1993, at 56, a survey of industry executives
shows that a majority of them predict that "40% of American homes ... will be wired to take full
advantage of new multimedia services from 1998 to 2000." Turner, supra note 93, at R6.
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holds, it took cable four decades, color television two decades, and
radio one decade. 157 Although invented in 1876, the telephone existed
in only forty percent of American households by the beginning of
World War ILI" Despite market uncertainty, some hardware operators
have announced aggressive wiring plans that will establish interactive
service in the near future.' 59
 Whether the positioning that such invest-
ment represents materializes sooner or later, however, it invariably will
implicate considerations of constitutional significance.
To the extent that interactivity redefines future media, it will
similarly recalibrate the relationship between operators and audiences.
As mass communication has evolved over the past century, its domi-
nant characteristics have been centralized editorial decision-making
and generally passive reception. Interactivity offers the potential for an
information marketplace in which input is not just the province of a
few. A primary advertisement for interactivity, in fact, is viewer control.
Equipment and subscription costs, along with education and the sense
of a stake in the society, may determine the actual extent and quality
of interactivity. Disparities in access to and usage of interactive media
also might result in broadened but still limited input opportunities in
an economically determined speech order.m Widespread access to
such enhanced communications methods could heighten pressure to
redistribute power in the information marketplace.
Irrespective of whether courts or policymakers opt for more or
less governance, broadband media are capable of significantly expand-
ing editorial sources. Viewers, listeners or readers traditionally con-
signed to a receiving role in theory would experience unprecedented
editorial opportunities. Two decades ago, Justice Brennan favored a
right of public access in broadcasting on the ground that it was impor-
157 Meyer, supra note 150, at 56.
1" Roberti. Samuelson, Last on the Information Hekhway,WAsee. Posy, Dec. 16, 1993, at A25.
15• Bell Atlantic, fin- instance, is spending $15 billion over five years to wire 1.2 million homes
for interactive service next year and 1.5 million homes annually thereafter. Robichaux, supra note
102, at R16. US West Communications, which provides telephone service to 13 million customers,
is spending $1,000 per customer to provide interactive service to 100,000 subscribers by the end
of this year and 500,000 annually thereafter. Rich Brown, US West Answers Video Mahone Gall,
lidloapc AST INC, Feb. 8, 1993, at 14. The nation's largest cable company, Tele-0)mM milcations,
Inc., expects to wire about 20% of the nation's homes for interactivity by mid-I996. Meyer, supra
note 156, at 45.
"in
 Some telephone companies planning to construct video dialtone networks already have
been criticized for plans that allegedly would bypass lower income and minority neighborhoods.
Christopher Stern, Miro Charged with Redlining on Info Highway, BRomecAsTeNe; & CA 1314 May
30, 1994, at 55. The regional Bell operating companies thusly complained of have denied the
allegations. id.
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tant to factor in speaking as well as viewing or listening interests.' 61
Lamenting that a soapbox society had been displaced by a mass media
culture, Justice Brennan endorsed redistribution and enhancement of
expressive opportunity. 162 As electronic media, including broadcasting,
acquire the capability to recreate an information marketplace charac-
terized by expanded speaking opportunities, constitutional doctrine
cannot logically stay locked in past understanding. Failure to adapt,
especially to the extent speaking opportunities multiply, would gener-
ate results even more distorted than the existing "unusual order."'"
Diminished First Amendment status for media evolving toward inter-
activity paradoxically would reduce protection at a time when technol-
ogy is expanding the opportunity for expressive input. A decade ago,
the Court suggested that it would revisit the unique premises of broad-
cast regulation and would abandon those underpinnings if they proved
outdated.' 64 As interactivity and choice become more significant char-
acteristics of modern media, the opportunity exists not only to avoid
anomaly in a discrete context but to decide what the First Amendment
means in a comprehensive sense for the future.
Ill, FACTORING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Conventional constitutional wisdom indulges the notion that a
tradition of less defeasible freedom for print preceded diminished First
Amendment status for newer communications technologies.'" Although
the constitutional legacy of electronic media reflects a reduced First
Amendment status for new media, that rank is not a divergence from
a prior norm. Content control of the print media compromised the
unabashed goal of federal regulation within a decade of the Constitu-
tion's ratification. 1 ''6 Regulation of content also was the focus of ante-
bellum laws prohibiting abolitionist speech and publications. 167 Pro-
posed tort reform in the late nineteenth century, urging attention to
161 CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 418 U.S. 94,182-83 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162 Id
163 The Court has referred to the creation of viewer and listener rights in radio and television,
and their prioritization over the editorial freedom of broadcasters, as an "unusual order" of First
Amendment interests. Id. at 101.
11-4 See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,376-77 n.11 (1984).
11'6 E.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370,1378 (10th Cir.
1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982).
1 "'The Sedition Act of 1798 was a Federalist inspired scheme to suppress criticism of political
officials and the Government and thus to silence their Jeffersonian rivals. See LEVY, supra note
52, at 196-97.
"17 State laws prohibiting abolitionist speech and publications are discussed in Wit,riAnt M.
WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 172-82
(1977).
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privacy interests and their prioritization over press freedom, foreshad-
owed broadcast regulation a century later, even as it responded to the
impact of print.' 18 To suggest that a tradition of relatively unimpaired
press freedom precedes the electronic media's diminished First Amend-
ment status misreads history. In fact, the Supreme Court never mean-
ingfully interpreted the First Amendment until newer media assumed
a significant presence.' 69 By the time the Court incorporated the Press
Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment,'" the Federal Government
had already enacted a comprehensive federal scheme to regulate broad-
casting.' 71
Over the second half of this century, a formal constitutional sort-
ing process has rated media based on an official sense of the unique
problems each presents. 172 Investment in a model of broadcast regula-
tion sharing the methods, if not the goals, of the English system for
licensing printers (abandoned in the late seventeenth century) pref-
aced formalization of the ordering scheme.'" Soon after the Court
repudiated a regime of prior restraint that had shut down a controver-
sial newspaper,'" Congress constructed the comprehensive regulatory
scheme that to this day revolves around the licensing of broadcasters.'"
By the same enactment, common carriers became subject to terms of
governance defined by equal access requirements and denial of First
Amendment status.'" Amendments to the Communications Act of
1934, half a century later, subjected the cable industry to laws and rules
pertaining, among other things, to franchising,'" rates, 178 access' 79 and
signal carriage.' 84
As future media present themselves for regulatory and constitu-
tional analysis, therefore, they do so not against a backdrop of older
and newer First Amendment traditions. Rather, they emerge in tandem
168 The "right to privacy" was proposed in part as a response to intrusive journalistic practices.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 55, at 195.
169 The Court's first serious examination of press freedom was in response to the advent of
motion pictures. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915),
overruled by Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
I 70 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931).
171 The Radio Act of 1927, which established the Federal Radio Commission and radio
licensing, was the precursor to the Communications Act of 1934, which created the FCC.
172 See supra notes 1—S and accompanying text.
173 See Livery, supra note 11, at 19.
"Near, 283 U.S. at 721.
"Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-509 (1988 & Stipp. 1992).
175 Id. at § 201(a).
177 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 541-46 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
178 47 U.S.C. § 543.
179 47 U.S.G. §§ 531-32.
180 Mandatory signal carriage rules, as discussed in note 67, at best have an uncertain future.
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with constitutional legacies that have evolved coincidentally along di-
vergent paths. Insofar as some commentators have understood media
as structurally different and a source of unique problems, they have
minimized the significance of a constitutional order defined by vari-
able burdens."' Even if such reasoning may have been appealing in
the past, it has outlived its utility in a media universe evolving away
from difference and toward convergence.
The future, as contemporary circumstances already indicate, be-
longs not to fixed structures lending themselves to differentiation, but
to digitalization and compression capabilities that facilitate conver-
gence. Emergence of a new (or redefinition of an existing) medium
generates significant pressure upon established regulatory regimes
conditioned to respond to recognized forms and experiences. The
strain upon existing regulatory frameworks already has been evidenced
by the consequences of technological mutation and innovation. Regu-
latory barriers to some extent have been cracked by the advent of video
dialtone service 2
 and merger and acquisition activitym reflecting the
inexorable pressure of market dynamics. Further erosion of barriers
establishing medium-specific restrictions on function may result from
legislative reaction to new communications realities.'"
Significant legal reform, essential if communications technology
is to achieve its potential, poses hard questions about media regulation
in general and the First Amendment in particular. For a small but
growing segment of the population, traditional distinctions between
cable, telephone and computer systems already have diminished sig-
nificance."5
 As noted, market opportunity has precipitated strategic
181 E.g., Bollinger, supra note 108, at 1 (arguing that variations in First Amendment freedoms
afford a mix of constitutional and regulatory positives).
182 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
184 Congressional initiatives, for instance, include proposals to relax rules prohibiting tele-
phone companies from offering cable within their own service areas, to allow regional operating
companies to offer long distance service and manufacture telecommunications equipment, and
to permit broadcasters to use part of their channels to provide digital voice, data and video
services. Kim McAvoy, Senate Opens Superhighway Lane for Broadcasters, BROADCASTING & CABLF.,
Feb. 7, 1994, at Ii, Although such legislation stalled out in a Senate committee after approval by
the House, Michael Dresser, Telecommunications Bill Dies in Senate's Endgame, BALTIMORE SUN,
Sept. 24, 1994, at C13. Even if Congress does not adapt regulatory procedures to evolving
technological and economic reality, the present order may be weakened by other means. Some
telephone companies, for instance, have bypassed restrictions on providing video programming
in their service area by challenging them in court. E.g., U.S. West, Inc. v. United States, 855
EStipp. 1184 (W.D. Wash. 1994). Such regulatory developments represent an early sense of
impending if not yet actualized convergence.
La5 See supra notes 142, 159 and accompanying text.
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alliances between and among media sectors that historically have had
antagonistic relationships.'m Legislative reform may expand the oppor-
tunities for cable companies and common carriers to compete on the
same field. Contemporary merger and affiance activity at minimum
illustrates a heightened awareness of common interest and mutual
opportunity within the industry.
In their present condition, cable and telephone systems offer one
another a significant asset that the other lacks. Despite extensive mul-
tichannel capacity, cable is currently unable to provide significant
interactivity.'" Telephone systems, despite the limited capacity of cop-
per wire, possess switching capability essential for interactive technol-
ogy, 188 A mutual attraction leading to working relationships between
cable and telephone is not likely to occur in a competitive vacuum.
Instead, significant interactive capacity will likely define broadcasting
and even the newspaper industry in the foreseeable future. 189 Sig-
nificant fallout from faltering cable-telephone company deals, more-
over, may include increased attention to the logic of strategic alliances
between common carriers and broadcasting or other methodologies. 19°
For a future defined by convergence, the crucial question is not
whether the First Amendment is relevant but which version of it should
apply. Separate freedom of press models for print and broadcasting
have resulted in contest-like circumstances for newer communications
technologies which must demonstrate which established medium they
resemble most. 191 Historically, attention to difference has been prob-
lematic because of the confusion, uncertainty and even incongruity it
has generated.' 92 Even assuming that medium-specific analysis eventu-
ally gives way, the critical issue that looms is what First Amendment
tradition will prevail.
Interactive media are emerging at a time when traditions of author-
itative selection and autonomous selection are respectively expanding
and contracting. 193 Because editorial management of electronic media
is so culturally ingrained, the legacy may carry over to governance of
186 Strategic alliances between cable and telephone companies in particular bring together
industries that have been bitter rivals dedicated to keeping each out of the other's business and
driven by concern that the other might obtain a competitive edge. E.g., Harry A. Jessell, Cities,
Cable Unite Against Video Dial Tone, BROADCASTING, Nov. 4, 1991, at 57.
1 /17JonN NAISBITT, GLOBAL. PARADOX 65 (1994).
1911
189 See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
186 Brown, supra note 147, at 6.
191 See supra note 20.
192 See supra notes 61-62, 113-22 and accompanying text
"Because electronic media are a major growth industry, contrasted with a static and even
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future communications methodology as a matter of habit. Reflexive
regulation may prove unfortunate, however, on both constitutional
and pragmatic grounds. Established models of managing expressive
pluralism have been criticized for "misconceivrind and underesti-
mating] the public's interest in receiving ideas and information di-
rectly from the advocates of those ideas without the interposition of
journalistic middlemen." 194
 Interactivity and multichannel capacity, at
least in theory, respond both to conditions that spawned regulation of
the electronic media and to identified deficiencies in their govern-
ance.'"
The benefits of interactivity, at least for now, may be overblown.
Research suggests that, where interactive media are in use, much more
traffic moves from a central distribution point to subscribers than in
the other direction.'" Given the relative novelty of interactivity, such
patterns may reflect the conditioning of historically passive viewing
roles. Early returns on usage tendencies, however, do not factor in the
consequences of greater experience that will accrue with the passage
of time and increased exposure. Interactive media thus retain an un-
precedented structural capability for replicating a soapbox culture.
Traditionally, significant unknowns have been an inspiration for
erring on the side of too much rather than too little control.' 97 To the
extent history repeats itself, it risks not only retarding the benefits of
technological progress, but also establishing the authoritative rather
than autonomous selection model pursuant to instinct rather than
reflection. Concern with the possibility of official overreaction, how-
ever, does not negate the interest in devising a logical and sensitive
balance between legitimate regulatory interests and constitutional im-
peratives. At minimum, the technology of interactivity and enhanced
choice should put to rest historical concern with scarcity. 1" Extension
declining print sector, curtailment of editorial freedom to account for diversity and fairness and
quality of discourse have become more normative than exceptional.
194
 CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 188-89 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
195
 Regulations grounded in scarcity concerns, in some notable instances, have defeated
underlying objectives of content diversification. See supra notes 132-33.
196
 Recent research indicates that 99% of traffic on interactive systems moves toward rather
than from subscribers. Sean Scully, Hubbard Says DBS is Highway Enough, BROADCASTING &
CAmx, May 24, 1993, at 72.
197
 The phenomenon is discussed in Donald E. Lively, Fear and the Media: A First Amendment
Horror Show, 69 MINN L. REV. 1071, 1078-91 (1985) (noting regulatory overreaction to motion
pictures, broadcasting and cable).
198
 Input opportunity overcomes the problem, which the Court stressed in the broadcasting
context, of "more individuals ... than ... frequencies to allocate"). Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969). Expanded programming options responds to interests in




of such regulatory premises might disclose once and for all that,
rhetoric notwithstanding, power and impact have been and continue
to be the real cause for attention to difference.
Concern with a medium's "capacity for evil" inspired the Court's
initial review of video service when it denied press status to motion
pictures.'99 A like worry permeates contemporary regulation of broad-
cast indecency, insofar as the Court stresses harm to children and
offended adults."' Official counteraction of power and immediacy is
technically impermissible as a general strategy, even if now routine
in certain medium-specific contexts."' In determining the rights and
obligations of those who will operate and use future media, attention
to the distribution of power in the information marketplace is probably
inevitable. Turf battles, such as whether television networks should
have a financial interest in syndicated programming, whether cable com-
panies should provide telephone service and vice-versa, and whether
long-distance and regional telephone companies should compete with
each other, center precisely upon that issue202 and herald a concern
likely to appreciate as media course toward convergence. For a culture
in which power and equality interests are locked in persistent struggle,
the relative influence of and relationship between carriers and content
providers will become a primary constitutional (and economic) focal
point. Regulatory precedent exists for responding in the event that
vertical integration and anti-competitive practices compromise access,
choice or interactivity." 3 Interest in the conditions and use of power
finds support in historical experience and, recently, in heightened
awareness that cable and telephone systems may be logical construc-
tion partners for an information highway. 2"4 Given their size, history
and advantage, neither the telephone nor cable industry will escape
judicial or legislative scrutiny begotten by concern with the potential
199 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comtn'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915), overruled by
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
200 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
201 The illegitimacy of such concern, at least in theory, is noted in Telecommunications
Research & Action Ct•. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 502, 508, 517-19 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S.
919 (1987). For examination of such concerns have influenced policy nonetheless, sec Lively,
supra note 197, at 1078-91. A classic scheme for redistributing expressive power is fairness
regulation. See ,supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
20 Rules limiting network financial interest and ability to syndicate programming, adopted
pursuant to concern with the relative economic power of networks and program suppliers, were
struck down in Sclsurz Communications v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1992).
203 Pursuant to concern that the cable industry was using its market leverage to stunt the
growth of new technology, such as wireless cable and direct broadcast satellite systems, Congress
and the FCC prohibited pricing schemes that discriminated among distributors. 47 U.S.C. § 521.
204 See supra notes 186-88.
1094	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 (Vol. 35:1067
abuse of power in the economic and information marketplace. 205 Bar-
ring monopolistic conditions, however, medium-specific premises are
not a logical analytical departure point.
Given the societal stakes, attention to the constitutional context
and consequences of media convergence is surprisingly scarce and
underdeveloped. Initial factoring of multimedia structure and interac-
tive capability has yet to uproot itself from traditional models of pre-
mature medium-specific reaction. The suggestion that interactive me-
dia should be subject to public forum analysis typifies such response. 206
Consistent with the historical experience of motion pictures, broad-
casting and cable, such thinking presumes pathology rather than reacts
to identified problems.2°7 In anticipating a need of managed access for
diverse expression, this response seems to reflect a focus upon discrete
operator proclivities minus the influence of a competitive environment.
A primary deficiency of medium-specific analysis has been its
failure to factor context. On first blush, the public forum model at
least facially projects logic and appeal insofar as an information high-
way conjures venues traditionally held open to speech."'
Even assuming the need for access facilitation, however, public
forum doctrine threatens constitutional interests. Depending in part
upon how the forum is characterized, a strategy to secure public access
against the risks of private content control could result in official
intrusion into editorial processes and diversity aims. Not all public
forums are the same for constitutional purposes. The Court affords
maximum constitutional protection to speech "[ii n places which by
long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly
and debate."2"9 For streets and parks, therefore, "the rights of the State
205 Industry practice is not without disturbing precedent. When the nation's largest cable
company (Tele-Communications, Inc.) was unable to reach a rate agreement with one commu-
nity, for instance, it "cut off service one weekend and ran the names and phone numbers of city
officials on the screen." Paul Farhi, Cable Pioneer Dug Its Roots in the West, WASH. POST, Jan. 23,
1992, at MO. A trial jury later hit the company with a $45 million jury award for "excessive and
intimidating conduct" toward a cable consultant who recommended ending its franchise in
another city. Id Such bullying tactics may elicit concern with the potential for abuse, insofar as
self-interest was prioritized over the need or sensitivity toward and tolerance of competing
perspectives.
2°6 Allen S, Hammond, IV, Regulating Broadband Networks, 9 YALE j. Ran. 181, '217-21 (1992).
207 The presumption, prior even to the meaningful development of broadband interactive
service, is that the market will be dysfunctional and inimical to First Amendment values.
2°8 Public highways are among those traditional forums that "have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496, 515 (1939).




to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed."2 " In such "quin-
tessential public forums," content-based exclusion is permissible only
when "necessary to serve a compelling state interest and . . . [the
regulation] is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." 2 "
A like standard of nondiscriminatory access applies when govern-
ment, although not obligated to keep the venue open, makes public
property available for expressive activity. 2 ' 2 To the extent a public place
is not a forum by tradition or designation, the Court does not consti-
tutionally guarantee access. The state thus may reserve the forum for
"intended purposes . . . as long as the regulation on speech is reason-
able and not an effort to suppress expression" on the basis of con-
tent.213
Despite the suggestive imagery of an information highway, recog-
nition of interactive media as the functional equivalent of a public
street may prove to be inaccurate. Unsuccessful efforts to equate city
utility posts,214 public employee mailboxes 215 and public airport termi-
nals with streets and parks"' illustrate the circumscribed nature of the
traditional public forum. Even to the extent that a court acknowledges
a traditional public forum, "reasonable time, place, or manner restric-
tions" have been a basis for sidetracking or diluting speech interests. 211
Time, place and manner controls can provide pretexts for official
determinations of what is fit for public discourse. 218 Such pretextual
difficulty might be avoided if the Court equates the information high-
way to public places where "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric," 219
or to modern media that require significant individual initiative for




 Id. at 45-46.
213 Id. at 46.
214 E.g., Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
215 Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 50-55 (1983).
216 lnternational Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2708-09
(1992).
217
 Clark v. Community for Creative Non-violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
218 Offensive expression, especially speech that is sexually explicit, has been subject to time
channeling in broadcasting and place channeling (zoning) in communities. See Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976) (upholding zoning regulation governing the siting
of such uses as adult theaters); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 E2c1 1332, 1341 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (upholding concept of time channeling but invalidating its specific application),
219
 Cohen v. California, 903 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
220E.g.„ Sable Communications v, FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989) (stressing rule requiring
credit cards, codes and scrambling devices to access dial-a-porn services).
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ing dubious or disingenuous concern with a non-speech related inter-
est or denying equal access requirements will prevail.22 '
Case law erects other significant barriers to an understanding of
interactive media as a traditional public forum. For a forum to rate at
the same level as a public street or park, the Court must be satisfied
that the forum "has traditionally been made available for public ex-
pression."222
 Given the editorial functions of media, and despite dis-
crete access requirements in some instances, reality undermines the
suggestion that media have traditionally been open to the public. Even
for the least protected medium, the general proposition of public
access has been formally rejected. 225
To the extent interactive media were characterized as a designated
forum, principles of equal access governing traditional forums would
apply provided the forum were kept open. 224
 Even then, designation
of interactive media as a public forum raises problems that transcend
First Amendment and management concerns. Unlike government ven-
ues that may be set aside for expression, interactive media implicate
significant private activity. Designated forum status not only may con-
flict with public understanding, but could also represent a taking. 225 As
the Court has noted, a public access requirement denies "the right to
exclude others, 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights
that are commonly characterized as property. "226
 Four Justices, al-
though unwilling to confront it yet, at least have acknowledged a
takings issue when government imposes carriage obligations upon a
medium otherwise vested with editorial discretion. 227
Such a redistribution of power and interest would place the Gov-
ernment in the role of editor, subject to equal access obligations. 228 It
221 E.g., id.; see also Sable, 492 U.S. at 133 (Scalia,,)., concurring) (suggesting that common
carriers are not obligated to carry indecent expression); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
749-50 (1978) (upholding regulation of indecent expression to protect children and because
medium is pervasive arid intrusive); Inthrmation Providers' Coalition for Defense of the First
Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 877 (9th Cir. 1991) (carrier may terminate service to dial-a-
porn operators).
222
 International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2705 (1992).
223
 CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110-11 (1973).
224 See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
225
 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation").
226 Dolan v. Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2320 (1994) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
227 Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2480 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting, joined by Scalia, Ginsburg & Thomas, JJ.) ("[s]etting aside any possible Takings
Clause issue" in reasoning that Congress might require cable operators to function as common
carriers).
228 CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm„ 412 U.S. 94, 149-50 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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also would establish the operation of interactive media as a function
of state action—a result that the Court avoided two decades ago in the
context of broadcasting:22" Nonresolution of the state action issue fol-
lowed a court of appeals decision to the effect that, because they enjoy
use of the public domain and are regulated as "fiduciaries of the
people," broadcasters serve as instrumentalities of the Governrnent. 2"
Although official licensing by itself has been rejected as a basis for state
action in other contexts, the court of appeals depicted a symbiosis of
public and private activity that it considered sufficient to implicate
constitutional interests."'
Had the Supreme Court upheld the state action finding, "few
licensee decisions on the content of broadcasts or the processes of
editorial evaluation would escape constitutional scrutiny." 232 To the
extent prohibitions against content discrimination superseded edito-
rial autonomy, media operators would have been subject to obligations
associated with common carriers."' As Justice Douglas noted, edito-
rial freedom would be fettered with respect to powers of exclusion—
"[p] olitics, ideological slants, rightist or leftist tendencies . . . [would]
play no part in its design of programs." 234 From Chief Justice Burger's
perspective, a state action determination would have been a travesty
for the "traditional journalistic role."235 Even if free to pick and choose
what they wished to present, media operators would have been denied
the freedom to exclude others on the basis of content. 23"
Provided that other channels of information exist, and competing
voices are not drowned out, a government editor function may not
pose policy problems. Equal access facilitates broad spectrum input
and it can be debated whether a system of diffused presentation would
be a worthy successor to the resources and organized perspective of
journalistic enterprise. Mass media realities over the course of this
century have heightened the journalistic function at the expense of
soapbox opportunity. A condition of state action may result in millions
229 Three justices refused to recognize broadcasting as state action. Id. at 119 (Burger, C.J.,
joined by Stewart, J., and Rehnquist, J.). Two would have found state action. Id. at 172-77
(Brennan, j., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.).
2" Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
revel, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
231 See id. at 652-53. The Supreme Court had previously found a symbiotic relationship
between a city-owned garage and a restaurant owner who leased space therein and provided
service on a racially exclusive basis. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
232 CBS, 412 U.S. at 120.
233 FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U,S. 689, 700-02 (1979).
234 CBS, 412 U.S. at 149 (Douglas, j., concurring).
235 Id. at 116.
236 See id. at 117.
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of platforms but no filtering or focusing mechanism. For an interactive
future, a system that accommodates editorial interests, facilitates sub-
scriber input and ensures "that everything worth saying shall be said,"
provides the ideal constitutional and social achievement. 237
 The future
may not be entirely predictable, but maximum accommodation is
unlikely to be achieved by premature response and trade-off.
The interests of optimization, accordingly, hinge upon avoiding a
precipitate response and minimizing the risk of repeating rather than
learning from history. Typically, as new media have emerged, regula-
tion prematurely has anticipated and magnified purportedly unique
problems and bypassed attention to overarching commonality of func-
tion."' The Court denied motion pictures First Amendment status for
the first half of this century, and, even now, films are not constitution-
ally immune to official censorship. 239
 Broadcasting similarly faced struc-
tural and content restrictions that induced a culture of caution and
orthodoxy. 24° Cable, especially during its early years, struggled under
regulation that slowed its development and limited its capacity to
compete with other media. 24 ' Cellular telephone service in the United
States suffered a delay of nearly a decade, as it fought official constric-
tion of its role and development. 242
Such a legacy warns against the danger of regulation that pre-
sumes dangers rather than responds to identified realities. One may
argue that the entrenchment of industrial presence and practice will
render any necessary regulatory response too little and too late. The
dismantling of AT&T a decade ago, however, refutes the notion that
regulatory initiative cannot reckon with even well-established agglom-
erations of private power. 243
 History actually suggests that the undoing
of misconceived or dated regulation presents a much more vexing
challenge. The long-standing concern with spectrum scarcity in broad-
casting exemplifies the difficulties of undoing miscalibrated policy and
its consequences. Despite extensive, persistent and compelling chal-
237 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL. FREEDOM 26 (1948).
238 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
239
 Even after being afforded First Amendment status, see supra notes 17, 201 and accompa-
nying text, motion pictures have remained susceptible to the possibility of official censorship,
provided adequate and speedy review procedures are afforded. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S.
51, 58 (1965).
24° See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5055 (1986).
241 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
242 Edmund L. Andrews, Technologies to Watch: From Anti Sense and Cl) Rom to Uhrafast Data
Transmissions That Can Find You, N.Y. Timr_s, Jan. 3, 1994, at C15.
243
 See generally United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Stipp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982),
affd, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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lenges to its validity,'" the fairness doctrine survived for decades before
the FCC finally acknowledged its deficiencies and jettisoned it."' Even
now, the underlying premise of spectrum scarcity survives as a regula-
tory rationale notwithstanding persuasive criticism illuminating its in-
aptness.'"
If policy toward interactive media is to be a function of lessons
learned rather than ignored, a fitting departure point is that operators
have a full measure of First Amendment freedom. Arguments for
access, whether based upon public forum doctrine or legislative enact-
ment, assume that subscribers may encounter roadblocks that limit
their opportunities. The economics of interactive media, however, may
work against exercises of editorial discretion that exclude or discrimi-
nate on the basis of content. Unlike broadcasting, which traditionally
has generated revenues by appealing to a mainstream audience and
thus has a vested interest in orthodoxy, 247
 interactive media must appeal
to diverse and discrete audiences. As with cable, interactive media's
total revenues derive from subscriptions by members of many discrete
audiences.'" A media operator, for ideological, moral or even eco-
nomic reasons, might implement content exclusionary or discrimina-
tory policies. A regulatory response to such practice, however, should
be made in the light of reality rather than in anticipation of the
possibility.
As interactive media evolve; the field may become crowded and
highly competitive.249
 To the extent effective alternative avenues of
expression remain open, a specific roadblock should not be the basis
for a comprehensive system of expressive management. Insofar as
244 Representative literature from a large volume of critical writing on the subject is cited in
note 45.
245 Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. at 5041.
246 E.g., Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 E2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir.
1986) ("Since scarcity is a universal Fact, it can hardly explain regulation in one context and not
another"), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
247 See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 187-88 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(broadcasters' interest in audience maximization, to optimize revenues from the sale of time to
advertisers, causes them to shy away from heterodoxy because "angry customers are not good
customers").
248 SnEt1.it MAIIONY ET AL., KEEPING PACE WITH THE NEW TELEVISION 101 (1980).
24• " Potenual providers of interactive media services include not only existing computer
on-line services, see supra note 142, but also long distance telephone companies, local exchange
carriers, see supra notes 94, 159, 186-88 and accompanying text, cable companies, see supra notes
147, 186-88 and accompanying text, direct broadcast satellite systems, see supra note 93 and
accompanying text, broadcasters, see supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text, wireless service,
see supra note 189 and accompanying text, and even print, see supra note 158 and accompanying
text.
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access problems emerge as an industry-wide phenomenon, the time
might come for a regulatory accounting. In that context, a system of
equal access might arise in response to real and identified need. Ad-
herence to traditional standards of First Amendment review, requiring
proof of a compelling regulatory interest instead of ad hoc constitu-
tional inventions, would seem to be the best strategy for satisfying
interests of efficiency, legitimacy and progress.
Even if the social implications of interactive media remain undis-
cernible, at least for purposes of framing a regulatory response, expe-
rience supports commitment to the highest level of judicial review. The
Court reserves strict scrutiny for those instances in which the profun-
dity of constitutional interests demands avoidance of guesswork. 2" At
stake in society's response to evolving circumstances of media conver-
gence is what the Court itself has characterized as "the matrix, the
indispensable condition of all other rights and liberties. "251
Transition from medium-specific to broad spectrum First Amend-
ment principle will yield both long-term and comprehensive conse-
quences. Given a jurisprudential record that did not directly begin to
consider the First Amendment until several decades ago, an unprece-
dented imperative exists for policy derived from reason rather than
reflex. Pending a convincing showing to the contrary, the multiplicity
of speech and press interests with a stake in media policy will be best
served by principles capable of facilitating rather than consuming a
system of autonomous editorial selection.
[V. CONCLUSION
Experience with new media will define in significant part the
long-term meaning of the Press Clause. Over two centuries, much First
Amendment doctrine has been serendipitous. Like other provisions of
the Bill of Rights, the First Amendment was enshrined as a politically
expedient afterthought."' Its extension to check more than the work
of Congress has been the function of an incorporation process of
debatable premises.'" A medium-specific menu of options, with respect
250 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (strict scrutiny used to
smoke out policy inimical to constitutional interests).
251 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
252 The Bill of Rights was proposed to appease antifederalist concern that, after the consti-
tution was drafted, threatened its ratification. DONALD E. LIVELY, FORESHADOWS OF THE LAW XV
(1992). Federalist support for the Bill of Rights was tactical, given the sense that such protection
was better accounted for by a system of representative governance and itemization might be
understood as an exclusive charting of rights and liberties. Id.
253 Although its terms prohibited abridgment of speech or press freedom by "Congress," U.S.
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to the First Amendment's meaning, has been a regimen indulged by
emphasis upon difference. As media converge, circumstances now
conspire to force a comprehensive reckoning with the meaning of the
First Amendment.
Responding to official management of modern broadcasting, Jus-
tice Douglas observed that the First Amendment's authors would have
been "shocked . . . at [the] intrusion of Government into a field which
in this Nation has been reserved for individuals." 254
 Despite a recog-
nized potential two centuries ago for private accumulation and abuse
of editorial power, official control was perceived as a more serious
evil.'" Perhaps the framers could not contemplate the dynamics that
transformed a cottage industry into media empires and profoundly
heightened the press's impact. The history of media regulation over
the course of this century, however, provides much to support the
warning that "(t)he development of constitutional doctrine should not
be based on . . . hysterical overestimation of media power and under-
estimation of the good sense of the American public."'" As an era of
interactivity and choice presents itself, it may be that some of the oldest
and most basic assumptions about press freedom are the least obsolete.
CONST. amend. I, the Speech and Press Clauses eventually were incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment and thus applied to the states. See supra note 170 and accompanying- text. Incorpo-
ration of the Bill of Rights had been rejected by the first Supreme Court decision interpreting
the Fourteenth Amendment. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 77-78 (1873). The incorporation
controversy, for practical if not academic purposes, largely has been resolved by selective incor-
poration over the past half century of all but three Bill of Rights provisions—the Second
Amendment's guarantee regarding the right to hear arms, the Fifth Amendment's provision for
grand juries and the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial in civil cases. JOHN E. NOWAK
ET Al.., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 10.2, at 315-18 (3d ed. 1986).
259 cliS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm„ 412 U.S. 94, 151 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
255 See id. at 151-52.
256 Louis L. Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness. and
Access, 85 HARV. L. Ray. 768, 787 (1972).
